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Executive Summary 
 
Section 9006 of Title IX of The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 (the “2002 
Farm Bill”) established the Renewable Energy Systems and Energy Efficiency Improvements 
Program (the “Section 9006 program”).  Administered by the United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA), the Section 9006 program provides grants, loan guarantees, and – perhaps 
in the future – direct loans to farmers, ranchers, and rural small businesses for assistance with 
purchasing renewable energy systems and making energy efficiency improvements. 
 
In the three rounds of Section 9006 funding to date (FY03-FY05), roughly 40% of all grant 
dollars in aggregate have been awarded to “large” (defined as > 100 kW) wind projects.  Such 
projects are also typically eligible for the Federal Production Tax Credit (PTC) codified in 
Section 45 of the US tax code.  Because the PTC provides a significant amount of value to a 
wind project, most “large wind” applicants to the Section 9006 program have also tried to take 
advantage of the PTC. 
 
Through what are known as “anti-double-dipping” or, more colloquially, “haircut” provisions, 
however, the size of the PTC is reduced if a project receives certain other forms of governmental 
support.  Specifically, Section 45(b)(3) of the US tax code reduces the size of the PTC in 
proportion to the aggregate amount of government grants, tax-exempt or subsidized financing, or 
other Federal tax credits that a project receives over time, relative to its overall capital cost (with 
the proportion not to exceed 50%).  The legislative and regulatory history surrounding the PTC’s 
haircut provisions suggests that grants and direct loans (but not loan guarantees) provided under 
the Section 9006 program will cause a PTC haircut. 
 
Focusing exclusively on “large wind” projects, this report demonstrates that the magnitude of the 
haircut can be significant:  Section 9006 grants lose between 11% and 46% of their face value 
(depending on the wind project’s capital cost and capacity factor) to PTC haircuts.  And because 
Section 9006 grants are most likely considered taxable income, an additional 20%-37% 
(depending on tax bracket) is lost to income tax payments on the grant.  In combination, 
depending on the specific combination of tax bracket, capital cost, and capacity factor that 
pertain to a given wind project, the percentage of a Section 9006 grant lost to both income tax 
payments and the PTC haircut can range from 31% to 83% of the dollar value of the grant.  Our 
base-case scenario falls in the middle of that range, at a combined loss of 58% (37% due to 
income tax payments, and 21% due to PTC haircut).  Add to this the transaction costs of 
applying for a Section 9006 grant, as well as the possibility of an unsuccessful application, and 
some might be left with relatively little motivation to apply. 
 
As a result, the USDA may – with Congressional approval potentially a prerequisite – wish to 
consider revising the Section 9006 program in order to maximize its value in the presence of 
other Federal incentives.  Although the taxation of the grant cannot be avoided,1 the PTC haircut 
(equal to 21% of the grant in the base case) is potentially avoidable, if not through direct 
                                                 
1 One must either pay tax on the grant (if taxable), or else reduce the depreciable basis of the project by the amount 
of the grant (if non-taxable).  The only difference between the two is the time value of money – the tax payment on a 
taxable grant hits up in the first year, whereas the equivalent loss of tax benefits associated with a reduction in 
depreciable basis occurs, for the most part, over a six-year period (assuming mid-year convention). 
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legislative relief, then through careful structuring of the incentive (which also may require 
statutory changes).  Specifically, with proper statutory authority, the USDA could potentially 
allow its grants to be used to defray operational – rather than capital – costs, depending on the 
preference of the recipient.  Alternatively, it could award the grant funding in the form of 
production-based payments, either paid out over time or as a lump sum at the inception of 
commercial operations (i.e., more like a traditional grant).  A combination of legislative history, 
public IRS guidance, and private letter rulings suggest that any of these three options will not 
trigger a PTC haircut (though advance consultation with the IRS is nevertheless advisable). 
 
Finally, the USDA is reportedly considering a direct loan program for future rounds of Section 
9006 funding.  Given the PTC interaction, such a program is likely to provide little (if any) value 
to projects that also take the PTC:  a government loan will either cause a PTC haircut that will 
likely result in a net loss (if subsidized), or else will provide little or no advantage over the 
private market (if unsubsidized).  It may be possible to structure a subsidized loan such that it is 
applied strictly to non-capital costs, and therefore does not offset the PTC, but there has been 
little experience with this type of structure to date, and consultation with knowledgeable tax 
counsel is strongly recommended before proceeding down this path. 
 
Given the complexities and nuances of tax law, the USDA would be wise to seek experienced 
tax counsel, and perhaps IRS guidance, prior to implementing any of the programmatic changes 
discussed in this report.  Furthermore, depending on how broadly the language in Section 
9006(a)(1) – i.e., that funds are to be used to “purchase renewable energy systems” – can be 
interpreted, each of the potential solutions to the double-dipping problem discussed in this report 
might require statutory changes to the Section 9006 program’s authorizing legislation (i.e., the 
USDA may not have the authority to make such changes on its own).  In this light, it is perhaps 
important to conclude by noting that the PTC's anti-double-dipping provisions were put in place 
for a reason.  While state renewable energy programs have generally been interested in 
structuring their incentives in ways that will not trigger a PTC haircut (i.e., states are looking to 
leverage as many Federal dollars as possible), Congress may be considerably less interested in 
modifying one Federal program (the USDA’s Section 9006 program) to allow the “double-
dipping” of another (the Section 45 PTC). 
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1.  Introduction 
 
As rural communities throughout the United States continue to struggle with population decline, 
job loss, and rising energy prices, farmers are increasingly turning to home-grown renewable 
energy and energy efficiency as a way to reduce their own energy costs, create jobs, diversify 
their income, and help meet the nation’s vast energy needs.  From biofuels to wind power, the 
agricultural community is poised to play a major role in energy production in the coming years. 
 
To this end, Section 9006 of Title IX of The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 
(the “Farm Bill”) established the Renewable Energy Systems and Energy Efficiency 
Improvements Program (the “Section 9006 program”).  Administered by the United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Section 9006 program provides grants, loan guarantees, 
and – perhaps in the future – direct loans to farmers, ranchers, and rural small businesses for 
assistance with purchasing renewable energy systems and making energy efficiency 
improvements.  The USDA expects this program to not only help farmers reduce their energy 
costs and the nation to meet its energy needs, but also to stimulate rural economic development 
by helping farmers, ranchers, and rural small businesses create new sources of income, new jobs, 
and new uses for agricultural products and wastes. 
 
By most accounts, the program has been a success, providing a major boon to agricultural 
communities.  In its first three funding cycles (FY03-FY05), the Section 9006 program has 
awarded roughly $65 million in grants – capable of leveraging a minimum of $200 million in 
private investment – to 430 projects aimed at reducing energy consumption, increasing energy 
production, and revitalizing rural communities (see Table 1, below).  Future rounds of funding 
(including one currently underway for FY06) will expand upon this already significant impact. 
 
The Section 9006 program, however, is only one of several ways in which the Federal 
government encourages the development of renewable generation.  Others include accelerated 
depreciation (for solar, wind, geothermal, and biomass), production tax credits (PTC) for wind 
and various other resources,2 and investment tax credits (ITC) for solar and geothermal.  Each of 
these tax incentives can be significant, and in some cases of greater value to a project than a 
Section 9006 grant.  At the same time, each of these Federal tax incentives will – through what 
are known as “anti-double-dipping” or, more colloquially, “haircut” provisions – be reduced in 
value to the extent that a project receives certain other forms of governmental support.3
                                                 
2 Resources currently eligible for the PTC (at least in some form) include:  wind, biomass (including co-firing and 
livestock waste), geothermal, certain types of hydropower, landfill gas, and municipal solid waste. 
3 Congress explained the rationale for anti-double-dipping rules in the conference report to the Crude Oil Windfall 
Profits Tax Act of 1980:  “The conference agreement provides rules to coordinate the business energy credits with 
other government subsidies for energy-related expenditures.  The conferees are concerned that if no such rules were 
adopted, the compound effect of various subsidized loan and grant programs could lead to a situation in which the 
taxpayer could purchase this property with very little expenditure of his own funds.  A potential result could be the 
encouragement of inefficiency through expenditures for equipment the production of which would require diverting 
substantial resources from more effective uses.  The effect of the rule provided in the conference agreement, in 
conjunction with the present treatment of nontaxable grants, is that the purchaser of the eligible equipment must 
choose between the tax credit, on one hand, and subsidized energy loans and nontaxable grants, on the other hand.  
Grants which are taxable are not taken into account under these rules because their taxation serves as a partial offset; 
similarly, credits against State and local income taxes are not taken into account because the deductibility of these 
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Traditionally, many individuals, including farmers, have not been able to make efficient use of 
Federal tax benefits for renewable energy projects for various reasons (Bolinger and Wiser 
2006a, Ing 2005).  Recent innovations in project ownership structures, however, have facilitated 
the indirect use of tax benefits by individuals and farmers (Bolinger and Wiser 2006a, Ing 2005).  
As a result, many Section 9006 grant recipients have tried to take advantage of some 
combination of these Federal incentives, only to find that anti-double-dipping provisions result in 
an aggregate incentive that is something less than additive.  For example, receipt of a Section 
9006 grant causes a PTC “haircut,” in effect rendering the true value of the Section 9006 grant 
substantially less than its face value (due to lost PTCs).  In addition, because Section 9006 grants 
are most likely considered to be taxable income, some portion of the grant will be lost in the 
form of higher income tax payments. 
 
Focusing exclusively on large wind projects funded under the Section 9006 program, this report 
explores the anti-double-dipping issue and suggests some ways to possibly avoid a PTC haircut.  
Its purpose is two-fold:  (1) to inform recipients of Section 9006 grants, as well as applicants and 
potential applicants to the program, of the implications of the PTC’s anti-double-dipping 
provisions; and (2) to help the USDA and related stakeholders understand the financial impact of 
such provisions, and possibly re-design the program to avoid that impact. 
 
The report begins in Section 2 with a brief description of Section 9006 program results to date.  
Section 3 describes the two primary Federal tax incentives for wind power – accelerated 
depreciation and the production tax credit – and reviews the mechanics of the PTC’s anti-double-
dipping provision.  Section 4 discusses specifically how the different elements of the Section 
9006 program – i.e., grants, loan guarantees, and perhaps in the future, direct loans – interact 
with Federal tax benefits.  Section 5 then quantitatively demonstrates the negative financial 
impact of this interaction.  Section 6 discusses several policy options that the USDA and others 
might consider to avoid PTC haircuts on grants and loans.  Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
taxes under the Federal income tax implies that the effect of these credits is equivalent to the effect of a taxable 
grant.” 
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2.  The USDA’s Section 9006 Program 
 
As envisioned by Congress in the 2002 Farm Bill, the Section 9006 program would provide 
“loans, loan guarantees, and grants to farmers, ranchers, and rural small businesses to (1) 
purchase renewable energy systems; and (2) make energy efficiency improvements.”4  In 
practice, however, only grants were funded under the first two Notices of Funding Availability 
(NOFA) in FY03 and FY04.  Loan guarantees were added as an option in FY05, with half of the 
available funds reserved (for a limited period of time) for that purpose.5  Grants and loan 
guarantees are again being offered in FY06, and the USDA will reportedly consider offering 
direct loans in future solicitations. 
 
Table 1 shows the number and dollar amount of grants awarded by resource to date.6  In its first 
three years, the program has awarded 430 grants totaling nearly $65 million dollars.  Since 
Section 9006 grants are capped at the lesser of 25% of eligible project costs or $500,000,7 the 
nearly $65 million in grants awarded to date represent a minimum (i.e., if all grants were at their 
25% limit) $260 million investment in rural economies throughout the United States, and the 
USDA has estimated the potential private investment to be much larger – closer to $800 million. 
 
As shown in the final column of Table 1, “large” (> 100 kW) wind projects account for 40% of 
total grant dollars awarded to date, followed by anaerobic digesters at 33% and bioenergy 
projects at 11%.  Efficiency accounts for 8%, and the remaining renewable technologies account 
for just 9% in aggregate. 
 
                                                 
4 The full text of Section 9006 is included as Appendix A.  For details on the 9006 program, see 
http://www.rurdev.usda.gov/rd/farmbill/9006resources.html or http://www.rurdev.usda.gov/rbs/farmbill/index.html. 
5 If unused after a certain period of time, funds reserved for loan guarantees become available to additional grants. 
6 In addition, two guarantees (not included in Table 1) for $10.1 million in loans were awarded in FY05. 
7 From Section 4280.110(c) of the final rule (see http://www.rurdev.usda.gov/rd/farmbill/section9006rule.pdf), 
eligible project costs include: 
(1) Post-application purchase and installation of equipment (new, refurbished, or remanufactured), 
except agricultural tillage equipment, used equipment, and vehicles. 
(2) Post-application construction or improvements, except residential. 
(3) Energy audits or assessments. 
(4) Permit and license fees. 
(5) Professional service fees, except for application preparation. 
(6) Feasibility studies and Technical Reports. 
(7) Business plans. 
(8) Retrofitting. 
(9) Construction of a new energy efficient facility only when the facility is used for the same purpose, is 
approximately the same size, and based on the energy audit will provide more energy savings than 
improving an existing facility. Only costs identified in the energy audit for energy efficiency 
improvements are allowed. 
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Table 1.  Grants Issued Under First Three Rounds of USDA Section 9006 Program8
 FY03 FY04 FY05 Total 
 # $ # $ # $ # $ 
Anaerobic Digester  30 $7,046,530 37 $9,508,946 13 $4,813,267 80 $21,368,743
Biomass – Bioenergy  12 $2,029,005 13 $3,136,132 11 $2,118,391 36 $7,283,528
Geothermal – Direct Use 0 $0 2 $285,353 2 $94,930 4 $380,283
Hybrid 6 $2,112,977 2 $126,992 1 $199,863 9 $2,439,832
Hydrogen 1 $400,000 0 $0 0 $0 1 $400,000
Solar > 10 kW 2 $624,350 1 $49,886 4 $626,480 7 $1,300,716
Solar <=10 kW 4 $101,216 1 $4,936 5 $35,375 10 $141,527
Wind > 100 kW 25 $7,201,769 26 $7,301,540 40 $11,251,373 91 $25,754,682
Wind <= 100 kW 9 $187,134 12 $585,290 6 $101,157 27 $873,581
Energy Efficiency 24 $1,504,252 73 $1,812,974 68 $1,610,429 165 $4,927,655
         
Total: 113 $21,207,233 167 $22,812,049 150 $20,851,265 430 $64,870,547
 
It is worth noting that electricity generated by each of the top three funded technologies – large 
wind, anaerobic digesters, and bioenergy, which together account for 84% of all grant dollars 
awarded to date – is potentially eligible for the PTC, presuming it is sold to unrelated parties and 
meets other eligibility requirements.  The rest of this report, however, will focus exclusively on 
large wind projects, for several reasons: 
• Large wind projects have so far led the program in terms of grant dollars awarded 
(having captured 40% of all grant commitments to date), and most often sell their output 
wholesale to unrelated parties, rather than consuming the power on-site. 
• Anaerobic digesters must be larger than 150 kW to qualify for a PTC that is half the size 
of that provided to wind projects (see Section 45(b)(4)(A) of the US tax code).  Based on 
the data sources used for Table 1, it is not clear (A) how many of the digesters funded 
under the Section 9006 program exceed the 150 kW threshold and (B) how much of the 
power produced is sold rather than used on-site.  This uncertainty, in combination with 
the reduced (halved) value of the PTC, makes double-dipping somewhat less of an issue 
for digesters than it is for large wind projects. 
• The Bioenergy category includes biofuels and potentially other non-power-producing 
technologies that are not eligible for the PTC.  In addition, like anaerobic digesters, open-
loop (as opposed to closed-loop) biomass receives half of the PTC’s stated value.  Given 
a lack of information about the specific technologies funded within the bioenergy 
category, as well as the halved value of the PTC for open-loop biomass, double-dipping 
is potentially somewhat less of an issue than it is for large wind projects. 
 
Excluding digesters, bioenergy projects, and other eligible Section 9006 technologies from the 
remainder of this report is not intended to minimize their importance, or the importance of 
understanding how the Section 9006 program may interact with other Federal support for such 
technologies.  Such interactions may (and do) exist and, although they are outside of the scope of 
this paper, deserve further study.9
                                                 
8 The sources of the information in Table 1 include:  http://www.eesi.org/publications/9006%20technologies.pdf 
(FY03), http://www.farmenergy.org/2004recipients2.pdf (FY04), and 
http://www.eesi.org/publications/Press%20Releases/2005/9.15.05%209006_awards.htm (FY05). 
9 For a recent analysis of how government grants, such as Section 9006 grants, interact with solar tax credits, see 
Bolinger and Wiser (2006b). 
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3.  Federal Tax Incentives for Wind Power 
 
The two main Federal incentives for wind power are accelerated depreciation and the production 
tax credit (PTC). 
 
3.1  Accelerated Depreciation 
 
3.1.1  Description 
 
Section 168 of the Internal Revenue Code provides a Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery 
System (MACRS) through which certain investments in wind (and other types of) projects can 
be recovered through accelerated income tax deductions for depreciation.  Under this provision, 
which has no expiration date, certain wind project equipment – including the turbines, 
generators, power conditioning equipment, transfer equipment, and related parts up to the 
electrical transmission stage – may qualify for 5-year, 200 percent (i.e., double) declining-
balance depreciation.10  A typical rule of thumb is that 90% of the total costs of a wind project 
qualify for 5-year MACRS depreciation, with much of the remaining 10% depreciated over 15 
years. 
 
3.1.2  Interaction with Other Incentives 
 
Relevant to the topic at hand, a project’s “tax basis” (i.e., the dollar amount to which 
depreciation schedules, and investment tax credits such as the solar and geothermal credits, 
apply) must be reduced dollar-for-dollar by the amount of any non-taxable government grant 
provided to the project.  Taxable grants (i.e., those grants considered to be taxable income), on 
the other hand, do not reduce a project’s tax basis, since taxation of the grant is viewed by the 
IRS to provide an offset that is equivalent (actually, more-than-equivalent, given the time value 
of money) to a reduction in depreciation benefits.  In other words, it is impossible to escape 
taxation of grants (even those deemed non-taxable):  one must either pay tax directly through an 
income tax payment (taxable grant), or indirectly over time through reduced depreciation 
benefits (non-taxable grant), with the only difference being the time value of money. 
 
3.2  The Production Tax Credit 
 
3.2.1  Description 
 
As authorized by the Energy Policy Act of 1992 and amended over time, Section 45 of the 
Internal Revenue Code provides a production tax credit for power generated by certain types of 
renewable energy projects, including wind power.  For wind power, the PTC provides an 
inflation-adjusted 1.5¢/kWh credit (equal to 1.9¢/kWh in 2006) for a 10-year period.  To qualify, 
power from the project must be sold to an unrelated party. 
 
                                                 
10 Assuming a half-year convention, the 5-year MACRS depreciation schedule for wind power equipment is spread 
over six years as follows:  20.00%, 32.00%, 19.20%, 11.52%, 11.52%, 5.76%. 
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Despite its much-discussed shortcomings (principally the periodic expiration of the credit, which 
has led to boom/bust cycles in the industry), the PTC has arguably been the single most 
important driver of wind power development in the United States.  When used efficiently, the 
PTC provides the equivalent of about $20/MWh of taxable revenue levelized over a 20-year 
project life.11  This significant amount of value – equal to between one-third and one-half the 
amount of revenue that can be earned through a long-term power purchase agreement – enables 
wind projects to price their power more competitively, and to generate competitive returns for 
equity investors. 
 
Because of the amount of value that the PTC provides, virtually every wind project – including 
“farmer-owned” wind projects targeted by the USDA’s Section 9006 program – seeks to make 
use of as much of the PTC as it possibly can.  To that end, a number of creative ownership 
structures have been developed in recent years to provide access to the PTC among projects that 
would otherwise not be able to use it (e.g., due to insufficient tax liability, passive credit rules, 
etc.).  Anecdotal evidence suggests that many of the large wind projects funded by the Section 
9006 program are making use of these structures, some of which are described in Bolinger and 
Wiser (2006a).12
 
3.2.2  Interaction with Other Incentives 
 
With wind projects trying to take advantage of both the PTC and the Section 9006 program, how 
the two interact becomes an important question.  Section 45(b)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code 
(titled “Credit reduced for grants, tax-exempt bonds, subsidized energy financing, and other 
credits”) contains what are commonly known as the PTC’s anti-double-dipping provisions, or 
more colloquially, the PTC’s “haircut” provisions.  Specifically, Section 45(b)(3) reads: 
 
The amount of the credit…for any taxable year…shall be reduced by the amount 
which is the product of the amount so determined for such year and the lesser of 1/2 
or a fraction –  
(A) the numerator of which is the sum, for the taxable year and all prior taxable 
years, of –  
(i) grants provided by the United States, a State, or a political subdivision of a 
State for use in connection with the project, 
(ii) proceeds of an issue of State or local government obligations used to 
provide financing for the project, the interest on which is exempt from tax 
under section 103, 
                                                 
11 Because the PTC directly reduces the amount of income taxes paid, it should be thought of as providing 
$19/MWh of after-tax income.  The amount of pre-tax income required to yield $19/MWh of after-tax income is 
$19/(1-marginal tax rate), or $29.23/MWh assuming a 35% marginal income tax rate.  At a 7% real discount rate, 
$29.23/MWh (2006$) for 10 years equals an equivalent PTC value of $19.38/MWh (2006$) levelized over 20 years. 
12 The most common of these structures is known as a “flip,” where a project sponsor with limited tax credit appetite 
teams with a passive, tax-motivated equity investor to co-own the project.  During the project’s first 10 years (i.e., 
the period of tax credits), the passive investor receives most or all of the tax credits and cash distributions, while the 
project sponsor receives very little.  After 10 years, the investors’ interests in the project flip, such that the project 
sponsor now receives most or all of the cash distributions (tax benefits have, by then, been exhausted), and the 
passive investor receives very little. 
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(iii) the aggregate amount of subsidized energy financing provided (directly or 
indirectly) under a Federal, State, or local program provided in connection with 
the project, and 
(iv) the amount of any other credit allowable with respect to any property 
which is part of the project, and 
(B) the denominator of which is the aggregate amount of additions to the capital 
account for the project for the taxable year and all prior taxable years. 
 
In other words, the “haircut” is a proportional, rather than dollar-for-dollar, reduction in the 
value of the credit calculated as the aggregate amount of “offending” dollars (described in (i) 
through (iv)) divided by the capital cost of the project, and capped at 50%.  The next section 
describes how this anti-double-dipping language specifically applies to the Section 9006 
program.13
 
 
                                                 
13 Though not covered here, the PTC can also be negatively impacted by incentives from state programs (e.g., see 
Ing 2002).  It is possible that some USDA-funded projects are also recipients of state incentives. 
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4.  Interaction Between the Section 9006 Program and Federal Tax 
Incentives for Wind Power 
 
The Section 9006 program currently offers grants and loan guarantees to qualifying projects, 
while direct loans are under consideration for future funding cycles.  This section describes how 
each of these three incentives interacts with the PTC within the context of Section 45(b)(3).  It 
also discusses any impacts on depreciation deductions, where relevant. 
 
4.1  Grants 
 
As currently structured, the Section 9006 grants clearly fall within the first offending category of 
“grants provided by the United States, a State, or a political subdivision of a State for use in 
connection with the project” [Section 45(b)(3)(A)(i)].  Past IRS rulings on the Section 29 and 
Section 48 credits, as well as the legislative history of both credits, “indicate that their respective 
offset rules apply only to grants and financing which subsidize project construction and 
equipment acquisition” (Ing, 2002).  Although the IRS has issued only limited public guidance 
on the Section 45 credit (the PTC) offset rule, the IRS rulings on Section 29 and Section 48 
provide insight as to how the IRS might interpret Section 45 (Ing 2002).  In fact, in a 1997 
general information letter to the California Energy Commission, the IRS stated: 
 
This legislative background suggests that Congress intended to apply the § 29 
safeguards and limitations to the § 45 credit and that the results pertaining to credit 
offsets under § 29 are warranted under § 45.  Therefore, there is a strong inference 
that the offset rules under § 45 should apply only to grants, credits, tax-exempt 
financing, subsidized energy financing, and other credits [sic] that relate to the 
construction or acquisition of the facility or its equipment ....(Ing 2002) 
 
Because Section 9006 grants are in many cases disbursed during the construction of the project 
(as the last money in), and are commonly applied towards the project’s capital costs, they will 
trigger a PTC haircut. 
 
Furthermore, if the Section 9006 grants are considered to be non-taxable, they will also reduce 
the project’s tax basis for depreciation purposes.  Section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code, 
however, generally defines gross (taxable) income to mean income derived from any source, 
except as otherwise provided in statute.  In general, the IRS broadly interprets this definition to 
treat government grants as taxable income unless statutorily excluded from taxation.  Since there 
does not appear to be any such exclusion pertaining to USDA Section 9006 grants, a reasonable 
default assumption is that USDA grants are, in fact, taxable.  In other words, the recipient must 
pay income tax on the grant, but is able to depreciate the full capital cost of the project. 
 
4.2  Loan Guarantees 
 
Of the four offending categories provided in Section 45(b)(3)(A), the third category pertaining to 
“subsidized energy financing” is the only one potentially relevant to loan guarantees.  Although 
Section 45 does not define subsidized energy financing, under Section 48, the term means 
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“financing provided under a Federal, State, or local program a principal purpose of which is to 
provide subsidized financing for projects designed to conserve or produce energy.”  While this 
definition is not sufficiently clear on its own to inform the question of whether loan guarantees 
are considered subsidized energy financing, a number of legislative and IRS determinations have 
explicitly stated that loan guarantees are not considered subsidized energy financing.  
Specifically, the conference report on the Crude Oil Windfall Profits Tax Act of 1980 took this 
position, as did both the proposed (but never implemented) 1982 supplemental regulation to 
implement the Section 48 credit offset rule and the 1997 general information letter from the IRS 
to the California Energy Commission (Ing 2002).  More recently, a private letter ruling has also 
held that a state loan guarantee program does not constitute subsidized energy financing.14   
 
As a result of these rulings, it is safe to conclude that loan guarantees offered under the Section 
9006 program will not cause a PTC haircut. 
 
4.3  Direct Loans 
 
As with loan guarantees, the third offending category of Section 45(b)(3)(A) pertaining to 
subsidized energy financing is the only one relevant to direct loans.  Based on the definition of 
subsidized energy financing provided in Section 48 – “financing provided under a Federal, State, 
or local program a principal purpose of which is to provide subsidized financing for projects 
designed to conserve or produce energy” – it would appear that whether or not any future Section 
9006 loan program causes a PTC haircut will depend in large part on whether the financing is 
considered to be subsidized, or below-market.  In Private Letter Ruling 8530004, for example, 
the IRS determined that a particular loan from a government agency was not considered 
subsidized energy financing because the agency certified that the borrowing costs of the loan 
were similar to what the recipient could have obtained in the private market. 
 
Presumably the primary reason for offering direct loans under the Section 9006 program would 
be to provide attractive – i.e., “subsidized” – financing.  Otherwise, there would be little point to 
offering such a program, particularly with a loan guarantee program in place – i.e., the borrower 
could do just as well in the private market.  Indeed, Section 9006(d)(1) of the 2002 Farm Bill 
itself specifies that “A loan made by the Secretary under subsection (a) shall bear interest at the 
rate equivalent to the rate of interest charged on Treasury securities of comparable maturity on 
the date the loan is approved.”  Because the credit quality of eligible borrowers will always be 
inferior to that of the US Treasury, a direct loan program that lends at Treasury-equivalent 
interest rates will most likely be considered subsidized, and will therefore cause a PTC haircut.  
It is also important to realize that subsidized energy financing not only affects the PTC (under 
Section 45 of the tax code), but also both the residential (Section 25) and commercial (Section 
48) solar investment tax credits.15
 
                                                 
14 See Private Letter Ruling 200318066 at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/0318066.pdf. 
15 So-called “at risk” rules may further limit the value of a loan program, if loans are made on a non-recourse basis.  
Further discussion of “at risk” rules is outside of the scope of this document, but see Ing (2005) for more 
information. 
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5.  Demonstrating the Financial Impact of the Section 9006 Program 
on Federal Taxes 
 
This section focuses exclusively on grants and loans, and ignores loan guarantees (which do not 
trigger a PTC haircut). 
 
5.1  Grants 
 
The financial impact of the interaction between Section 9006 grants and Federal tax benefits can 
be examined in several ways.  One way is to simply map out the relevant projected cash flows, 
implement the tax interactions discussed in the previous section, and observe the results in terms 
of present value of cash flows.  Another approach involves making use of a financial pro forma 
model to ascertain the impact of tax interactions on some chosen metric, such as the levelized 
cost of energy from the project.  The analysis discussed below was conducted using both 
approaches, and arrived at the same answers either way. 
 
Table 2 presents results from the former, simpler analysis (i.e., in terms of present value dollars 
and percentages, rather than $/MWh and percentages).  Specifically, under what seems to be an 
appropriate base-case scenario (described below the table), Table 2 shows both the dollar and 
percentage amounts of a $500,000 Section 9006 grant that are lost to taxation (in the first 
column) and a PTC haircut (in the second column).  The final column shows that, at least under 
this base-case scenario, more than $290,000, or 58% of a $500,000 taxable grant, is lost to tax 
payments and the PTC haircut. 
 
Table 2.  Amount of $500,000 Grant Lost to Taxes and PTC Haircut:  Base-Case* 
 
Present Value of Loss
to Income Taxes 
Present Value of Loss
to PTC Haircut 
Present Value of
Combined Loss  
$ % $ % $ % 
If Grant is Taxable16 $182,727 37% $107,323 21% $290,050 58% 
 
*The base-case scenario is as follows:  1.5 MW wind turbine, $1600/kW project cost, $500,000 USDA grant (20.8% 
of project costs), 30% net capacity factor, marginal tax rates of 35% (Federal) and 8% (state), 90% of project cost 
depreciated using 5-year MACRS, 5% of project cost depreciated using 15-year MACRS (with the remaining 5% 
not depreciated at all), 2.5% inflation rate, 10% nominal discount rate. 
 
As will be described below, the base-case results presented in Table 2 will only vary (in 
percentage terms) based on (1) assumed tax brackets (for income taxes only) and (2) project 
capital costs and capacity factor (for the PTC haircut only).  The other two major variables –
project size and grant size – do not matter, for the following reasons: 
                                                 
16 If the USDA grant were considered to be non-taxable, then there would be a reduction in depreciation deductions 
over time (rather than a first-year income tax payment on the value of the grant) with a present value of $145,082 
(equal to 29% of the USDA grant).  This loss is less than for a taxable grant (shown in Table 2) due solely to the 
time value of money.  The loss to the PTC haircut would be the same as for a taxable grant (present value of 
$107,323, or 21%), leaving the combined loss at a present value of $252,405, or 50% of a non-taxable USDA grant.  
As noted earlier in Section 4.1, however, it appears that the Section 9006 grants should be considered taxable, rather 
than non-taxable, income, in which case the values presented in Table 2 are what are relevant. 
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• Project Size:  Project size does not impact income tax payments on the grant, but does 
impact the size of the PTC haircut:  because the Section 9006 grants are capped at 
$500,000, they will cause a smaller proportional PTC haircut as project size increases.  
Larger projects, however, produce more power and therefore earn more PTCs, which 
perfectly negates the smaller proportional percentage haircut and leaves the percentage of 
the USDA grant lost to the PTC haircut unchanged. 
• Grant Size:  Unless the size of the grant shifts the recipient from one tax bracket into 
another, the recipient will pay the same percentage of income tax regardless of the dollar 
amount of the grant.  Similarly, the percentage of the USDA grant lost to the PTC haircut 
remains the same regardless of the dollar amount of the grant. 
 
At the 35% Federal income tax bracket (currently the maximum personal bracket, and most 
likely corporate bracket) assumed in the base case, the percentage of a taxable grant lost to 
income tax payments is 37% (assuming an 8% state bracket, and that state tax payments are 
deductible from taxable Federal income).  The percentage of the grant lost declines to 28% at a 
25% Federal bracket, and 20% at a 15% Federal bracket (assuming the same 8% state bracket).17
 
Figure 1 illustrates how the percentage of the grant lost to PTC haircuts only (income tax 
payments are not included in Figure 1) varies based on project capital costs and capacity factor.  
As capital cost increases, the grant becomes a progressively smaller proportion of overall capital 
costs, causing a smaller percentage PTC haircut, which in turn results in less of the grant being 
lost.  Meanwhile, as capacity factor increases, so do the number of PTC’s generated, thereby 
increasing the dollar impact of a given percentage haircut.   
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Figure 1.  Percent of Section 9006 Grant Lost to PTC Haircut as a Function of Project Cost 
and Capacity Factor 
                                                 
17 In 2005, the 25% personal tax bracket applied to those married filing jointly with taxable income between $59,400 
and $119,950.  The 15% tax bracket applied to those married filing jointly with taxable income below $59,400. 
 11
 
It is important to note that the values depicted in Figure 1 are not additive.  In other words, to 
find the percentage of the grant lost for a given combination of capital cost and capacity factor, 
one must look specifically at that scenario, rather than simply adding the relevant results for each 
line in Figure 1.  At the high extremes represented in the figure, $1000/kW at a 40% capacity 
factor results in 46% of the grant being lost to the PTC haircut alone (not considering the income 
tax payment, which will take back an additional 20-37%, depending on tax bracket).  At the low 
extremes, $2,500/kW at a 25% capacity factor results in just 11% of the grant being lost to the 
PTC haircut (again, not considering the tax payment). 
 
In summary, depending on the specific combination of tax bracket, project cost, and capacity 
factor that pertain to a given wind project, the percentage of a Section 9006 grant lost to both 
income tax payments and the PTC haircut can range from 31% to 83% of the dollar value of the 
grant.  Our base-case scenario falls in the middle of that range, at a combined loss of 58% (37% 
due to income tax payments, and 21% due to PTC haircut). 
 
5.2  Direct Loans 
the three financial instruments allowed under Section 9006(a) of the 2002 
arm Bill.  Although the USDA does not yet offer direct loans under the Section 9006 program, 
 
 
 identical market-rate loan, over the life 
f the loan.  The larger the interest rate subsidy, the greater the financial benefits.   
ed 
 
matches the base-case project 
escribed in the previous section under Table 2 (except without the Section 9006 grant).  With 
ds currently yielding about 5.25%, such a project seeking a 10-year market-
 encounter interest rates in the vicinity of 7.25%, which is, therefore, the 
s 
t is based solely on the face value of the loan, and therefore is the same for both loans).  
 
Direct loans are one of 
F
it is reportedly considering doing so in future funding cycles.  Section 9006(d)(1) requires that
the interest rate on such loans must match that on Treasury securities of comparable duration.  
This suggests that a direct loan offered under the Section 9006 program will be subsidized, and 
will therefore subject borrowers to a PTC haircut.  This section of the report analyzes whether 
the financial benefit of a subsidized loan outweighs the cost of the corresponding PTC haircut. 
 
The financial benefit of a subsidized loan can be thought of and calculated as the present value of
the reduction in loan payments, relative to an otherwise
o
 
Using this methodology, Figure 2 illustrates the present value impact of two different subsidiz
loans, as a function of the amount of debt in a wind project.  Section 9006(c)(1)(B) limits the 
maximum combined amount of a grant, loan, or loan guarantee to 50% of project costs, so Figure
2 caps leverage at 50%.  The specific wind project analyzed 
d
10-year Treasury bon
ate loan would likelyr
benchmark or basis for comparison in Figure 2. 
 
The solid blue line (with circle markers) shows the present value dollar benefit of the Treasury-
comparable Section 9006 loan (with an interest rate of 5.25%, or 200 basis points below the 
market interest rate).  For illustrative purposes only, the solid green line (with “x” markers) 
shows the present value dollar benefit of a heavily subsidized loan (with an interest rate of 
1.25%, or 600 basis points below the market interest rate).  The solid red line (no markers) show
e present value dollar impact of the PTC haircut caused by both subsidized loans (the PTC th
haircu
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The dashed lines (with corresponding markers) represent the net financial benefit of each loan (in 
present value terms), after accounting for the PTC haircut.   
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Figure 2.  Present Value Impacts of Two Subsidized Loans as a Function of Leverage 
 
As shown, the Treasury-comparable Section 9006 loan (at 5.25% interest) has a negative net 
benefit – i.e., the present value of the PTC haircut is greater than the present value of the 
reduction in loan payments – that grows progressively more negative as the size of the loan 
increases.  The green lines, meanwhile, illustrate that the interest rate would have to be 
subsidized by about 600 basis points – i.e., from 7.25% down to 1.25% – before the net benefit 
of a subsidized loan would become positive (presuming the project is otherwise able to utilize 
the PTC).   
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6.  Policy Implications:  Potential Ways to Avoid a PTC Haircu
 
Although the income tax implications of a Section 9006 grant cannot be avoided,
t 
 
at is attributable to the PTC haircut – i.e., 21% in the base case results presented in 
able 2 – is potentially avoidable, if not through direct legislative relief, then through careful 
ructuring of the incentive (which may, in some cases, also require statutory changes).  This 
section begins by exploring a few different ways in which the USDA might seek to mitigate or 
eliminate the impact of the PTC haircut on its grant program.  It then highlights some PTC-
related factors for the USDA to consider as (or if) it moves towards developing a loan program. 
 
6.1  Grants:  Solving the Double-Dipping Problem 
 
The most straightforward solution to the double-dipping problem is to seek legislative relief.  
Congress could, for example, exempt Section 9006 grants from triggering the PTC’s anti-double-
dipping provisions in Section 45 of the tax code.  Whether such an exemption is politically 
feasible or not is an open question. 
 
In the absence of a direct legislative fix to Section 45, there are several ways in which the USDA 
might alter the structure of its Section 9006 grants in order to avoid PTC haircuts.  These include 
allowing grants to be used solely for operational expenses, or structuring the incentive as a 
production-based payment, or alternatively as an advance production-based payment.  The latter 
two approaches have been successfully employed by state “clean energy funds” that have, since 
1998, been providing cash incentives to utility-scale, PTC-eligible wind projects,19 and have as a 
result been forced to grapple with PTC interaction issues.  All three of these approaches may 
ultimately require statutory changes to the Section 9006 enabling legislation.20
 
6.1.1  Grants Earmarked to Cover Operational Expenses 
 
As noted earlier in Section 4.1, the IRS has ruled in the past (with respect to the Section 29 and 
Section 48 credits, and by extension to the Section 45 credit) that only grants and subsidized 
financing used for “the construction or acquisition of the facility or its equipment” will trigger a 
PTC haircut (Ing 2002).  Grants that are earmarked to cover operational expenses, on the other 
hand, should not offset the PTC, because “such payments to defray the wind farm’s non-capital 
repairs and the maintenance workers’ salaries do not relate to the facility’s construction or 
acquisition” (see Section IV.D of Ing 2002).  To ensure that such a grant is not misconstrued as a 
capital grant, it should be disbursed after the project has achieved commercial operations, with a 
refund of the grant somehow guaranteed (e.g., through a letter of credit) in the event that the 
                                                
18 the amount
of the loss th
T
st
 
18 The financial impact could, however, be mitigated somewhat if Section 9006 grants were considered to be non-
taxable.  For more information, see footnote 16. 
19 For more information on the activities of state clean energy funds in this area, see Bolinger and Wiser (2006c). 
20 Whether legislative action is required to implement these changes to Section 9006 may depend, to some extent, on 
how broadly the language in Section 9006(a)(1) – i.e., that funds are to be used to “to purchase renewable energy 
systems” – can be interpreted.  At face value, grants earmarked for operational expenses, as well as production-
based payments, presumably do not help recipients to “purchase” their projects.  As such, a legislative change to the 
wording of Section 9006(a)(1) – e.g., “to purchase and/or support renewable energy systems” – may be required in 
order to implement any of these potential solutions to the double-dipping problem. 
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project ceases operations prior to expending the full amount.21  Operational grants will be 
onsidered taxable income to the recipients and, like the current Section 9006 grants, will c
therefore not impact tax depreciation. 
 
Though this is arguably the simplest way to restructure a grant in order to avoid a PTC haircut, 
operational grants have not been extensively used in past renewable energy support programs 
the Federal or state level).  For example, most state clean energy funds have instead used 
production-based payments, awarded either over time or in advance (as described in the next tw
sections), to support utility-scale renewable energy projects.  This trend could simply reflect a 
hilosophical desire among clean energy funds to utilize incentives that reward good project 
(at 
o 
nce by statute the Section 9006 
re of the grant to cover 
 
ves to utility-scale 
ayments – e.g., $Y/MWh over an 
ear production payments to 
Finally, because they are paid over time, production payments will (unless the time value of 
e 
p
performance, rather than providing unconditional grants.  Si
rogram already provides capital grants, however, tweaking the structup
operational rather than capital expenses could be a relatively painless administrative transition
(though one that might require legislative action) with a large payback in terms of PTCs.  
Because of the lack of historical experience with operational grants, however, the USDA may 
wish to seek IRS guidance as to the feasibility and requirements of such an approach. 
 
6.1.2  Production-Based Payments 
 
Past IRS rulings on the Section 29 and Section 48 credits have held that loan guarantees, 
purchase commitments, price support loans, price support payments, and other non-capital cost 
assistance do not reduce the value of the PTC.  A 1997 general information letter from the IRS to 
the California Energy Commission further suggests that the Section 29 rulings are applicable to 
the Section 45 PTC (Ing 2002). 
 
s a result, a number of state clean energy funds have structured their incentiA
wind power projects as “price support” or “production-based” p
-year period.  California was the first to do so, auctioning 5-yX
qualifying projects as early as June 1998.  Since then, a number of other states, including 
Pennsylvania, Minnesota, New Jersey, and New York have followed suit.  Such payments are 
considered to be taxable income to the recipients. 
 
Production payments not only preserve the value of the PTC, but also better align the incentives 
of society and the developer than do grants, by rewarding efficient project operation rather than 
project construction.  On the downside, production payments carry a higher administrative 
burden than do grants, due to the need to track production over time.  In addition, production 
payments paid over time do not match up particularly well with the financial needs of most 
renewable energy projects, which tend to have high capital costs and low operating costs.  
money is properly taken into account when structuring the payments) have a lower present valu
                                                 
21 Such grants need not be limited to a single year’s worth of operational expenses, but could instead be sized to
cover several years’ worth of operational expenses.  In other words, the size of the grant need not be limited by the 
amount of annual operating expenses.  Grants sized for multi-year commitments will most likely need to be secured 
by a letter of credit or some other mechanism to ensure that the funds are spent as in
 
tended.   
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than an equally sized grant,22 and will also be riskier than an up-front grant due to the poss
of default. 
 
ibility 
.1.3  Advance Production-Based Payments 
 
 
ffer a 
roduction 
ayment, which is considered taxable income, provides many of the same benefits as a grant.  
duction-based payment will likely not trigger a PTC 
aircut, if structured properly. 
 
ote the following: 
 
r 
cing.  [Emphasis added] 
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A related approach that may prove to be more attractive (to both the grantor and grantee) than a 
production-based payment is to provide what’s known as an advance production-based 
payment.23  In this case, rather than paying out the incentive over time as the project generates 
power, the grantor would provide the lump-sum equivalent of the production incentive at the 
start of commercial operations, with a requirement that the project pay back any portion of the
incentive that is not earned as expected via actual production over time.   
 
Relative to a regular production-based payment (discussed above in Section 6.1.2), an advance
production-based payment better matches a project’s need for up-front capital, does not su
potential loss in value due to the time value of money, and does not carry the risk that the 
government will default on future funding commitments.  In other words, an advance p
p
Unlike a grant, though, an advance pro
h
 
To avoid a PTC haircut, an advance production-based payment should be awarded only after the
project has achieved commercial operations.  Otherwise, the payment could be considered 
subsidized financing.  Specifically, in the pre-amble to a 1982 proposed regulation concerning 
the Section 48 credit, the IRS wr
 
[P]rice guarantees and purchase commitments are not considered subsidized energy 
financing since these types of arrangements confer only a contingent benefit.  
However, if funds are advanced under a price guarantee or a purchase commitment
agreement which, in effect, results in a loan (for example, where payments unde
the agreement are made before the project becomes operational), these advances 
are considered to be subsidized energy finan 24
 
In other words, awarding the payment after the project has achieved commercial operations helps
ensure that the award will not be used for capital or equipment-related expenditures, which do 
trigger a PTC haircut.   
                                                 
22 For example, under the base-case assumptions described in Section 5.1, the after-tax present value of $500,0
provided as a 5-year production payment (i.e., $100,000 per year for five years) is $226,689 – i.e., 55% less t
$500,000 face value.  In comparison, the after-tax present value of $500,000 provided as an up-front grant is 
$317,273 – i.e., 37% less than its $500,000 face value (see Table 2 in Section 5.1).  In other words, switching to a 5-
year production payment in order to avoid a PTC haircut (equal to 21% of the $500,000 face value, per Table 2) 
00 
han its 
costs the project 18% of the $500,000 face value, for a net gain of just 3% of the $500,000 face value.  Though this 
may hardly seem worth the effort, note that this example also provides a financial benefit to the grantor – i.e., the 
present value of the 5-year production payment is just $379,079, or 24% less than its $500,000 face value.  If, 
however, the 5-year production payment is adjusted to account for the time value of money (such that its present 
value equals $500,000), then there will be no financial difference between it and an up-front grant (other than the 
avoided PTC haircut). 
23 Alternatively known as an “advance supplemental production payment” or “advance production incentive.” 
24 Federal Register, Vol. 47, No. 17, page 3559 (January 26, 1982), as cited in Ing (2002). 
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To date, three state clean energy funds – in Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Oregon – have offered 
me form of advance production-based payment to wind projects.  The IRS has weighed in on 
n only to the specific recipients of such 
ayments that requested the rulings. 
d payment.  The 
ayment was contingent upon two independent parties – an independent engineer and the power 
rgy to 
lthough the IRS ruled that this incentive structure would not trigger a PTC haircut,26 its 
re of 
Illino
 
In 200 ed 
the 54 n 
payme  
procee  project owner is 
quired to spend the proceeds on operating expenses over a certain term, and will earn the 
As it did in the earlier Waymart ruling in Pennsylvania, the IRS ruled that ILDCEO’s advance 
so
all three, through private letter rulings that pertai
p
 
Pennsylvania 
 
In 2000, the Sustainable Development Fund (SDF) – a private non-profit community 
development financial institution that administers one of Pennsylvania’s clean energy funds – 
awarded the 64.5 MW Waymart wind project an advance production-base
p
purchaser – confirming that the project was operational and delivering power.  In addition, SDF 
required the project owner to post a letter of credit for the full incentive amount with SDF, to 
serve as security to reimburse SDF in the event the project failed to generate sufficient ene
have earned the production incentive.  The amount secured by the letter of credit declines each 
quarter as the project generates power, until the project has earned the full amount of the 
incentive.25
 
A
determination was based on SDF not being a “governmental” unit – i.e., the IRS did not 
comment on the structure of the incentive itself.  As such, further clarification on the structu
the incentive has been required (and, fortunately, provided with respect to an Illinois project, 
discussed below). 
 
is 
2, the Illinois Department of Commerce and Economic Opportunity (ILDCEO) award
.45 MW Crescent Ridge wind project a $2.75 million “advance supplemental productio
nt.”  As described in Private Letter Ruling 200318066,27 ILDCEO would disburse the
ds of the award only when the project is completed and in service.  The
re
proceeds as it produces and sells electricity over a different (presumably longer) term.  If either 
of these conditions is not met, the project owner must repay the ILDCEO. 
 
supplemental production payment would not trigger a PTC haircut.28  This ruling, however, is 
more significant than the Waymart ruling, in that it is presumably based on the structure, rather 
than the administrator, of the incentive.  In other words, the fact that ILDCEO is clearly a 
                                                 
25 Under base-case assumptions described earlier in Section 5.1, and also assuming a letter of credit fee equal to 1% 
of the amount secured, a declining letter of credit to secure a $500,000 advance production payment over 5 years 
would cost about $12,000 (in present value terms), or about 2% of the $500,000 face value.  Though a letter of 
may carry other indirect costs as well (e.g., a reduction in the amount of debt the project can support), this appears t
be a small price to pay in order to avoid a PTC haircut. 
credit 
o 
ling 200202048, at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/0202048.pdf26 See Private Letter Ru
27 http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/0318066.pdf
28 Incidentally, PLR 200318066 also confirmed that a governmental loan guarantee would not trigger a PTC haircut. 
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governmental entity (unlike SDF in Pennsylvania) suggests that the IRS found the incentive 
 a related but not entirely analogous situation, the IRS ruled (in Private Letter Ruling 
hat the Energy Trust of Oregon’s advance purchase of a wind project’s renewable 
nergy credits (RECs) would not trigger a PTC haircut.  The project would earn the advance 
 amount 
ary 
 cover 
in 
 a letter of credit) to ensure that the grant is used as intended.  Though there 
re strong indications that operational grants conforming to these guidelines will not reduce the 
the PTC, there do not appear to be any explicit IRS rulings to that effect.  As such, the 
SDA may wish to seek IRS guidance before proceeding down this path. 
, 
ate letter 
ling involving an Illinois wind project suggests that, if properly structured, an advance 
generation must be tracked over time.  An advance production-based payment, however, more 
 
structure itself to be satisfactory. 
 
Oregon 
 
In
200439038)29 t
e
payment as it delivers electricity to the power purchaser over time, and must repay “an
equal to any portion of the advance payment that has not been earned by the 15th year after 
commencement of commercial operations.”   
 
Like the SDF in Pennsylvania, the Energy Trust of Oregon is a non-governmental, non-profit 
administrator of that state’s clean energy fund.  As such, it is not clear to what degree the IRS 
ruling was based on incentive administration rather than structure, which limits the value of this 
ruling. 
 
6.1.4  Summ
 
From the USDA’s current position of providing grants to defray capital costs, perhaps the 
simplest way to fix the PTC haircut problem is to allow Section 9006 grants to be used to
operational, rather than capital, expenditures, depending on the preference of the recipient.  
Operational grants will likely need to be provided after the project is operational, and secured 
some way (e.g., by
a
value of 
U
 
In contrast, a combination of legislative history and public IRS guidance appears to provide 
sufficient clarity that production-based payments will not trigger a PTC haircut.  Advance 
production-based payments, on the other hand, have been addressed by just a few private letter 
rulings.  Although private letter rulings are directed only to the taxpayers who requested them
and may not be used or cited as precedent, they nevertheless provide some insight as to how the 
IRS might interpret Section 45 with respect to this incentive structure.  One such priv
ru
production-based payment will also not trigger a PTC haircut. 
 
Both production-based and advance production-based payments are more administratively 
burdensome than a traditional grant, simply due to the fact that, by definition, electricity 
closely approximates a grant in that only one payment is made (reducing administrative burden 
somewhat), and that payment is disbursed closer to when it is most useful to the project – upon
commencement of commercial operations.  In addition, there is no potential loss of value due to 
the time value of money, and also no risk that the government will default on future funding 
commitments. 
                                                 
29 http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/0439038.pdf
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Finally, it should be noted that all three potential solutions to the double-dipping problem 
iscussed above might require statutory changes to the Section 9006 program’s authorizing 
n (i.e., the USDA may not have the authority to make such changes on its own).   
n will likely provide negative net economic value 
 a project, after considering the impact of the corresponding PTC haircut.  Given the likelihood 
d, there are potentially ways to provide subsidized loans that may not trigger a PTC 
aircut.  In general, specifying that the loan be used for non-capital-related (or at least non-PTC-
tures might accomplish this goal.  For example, in 2002, the Illinois Finance 
uthority provided the 54.45 MW Crescent Ridge wind project with a zero-interest, long-term 
ad 
o be 
tructuring subsidized loans in ways that might avoid a PTC haircut is a relatively novel and 
 
d
legislatio
 
6.2  Direct Loans:  Issues to Consider 
 
Although the USDA does not yet offer direct loans under the Section 9006 program, it is 
reportedly considering doing so in future funding cycles.  Section 4.3 above noted that a below-
market USDA loan program will likely be considered “subsidized energy financing,” while 
Section 5.2 demonstrated that a subsidized loa
to
that costs will exceed benefits in the presence of Federal tax credits, the USDA may wish to 
reconsider the value of providing a subsidized loan program. 
 
That sai
h
related30) expendi
A
loan of $2,880,000 to capitalize half of the initial required reserve funds for debt service, ro
repair, and project decommissioning.  The loan was scheduled to close at the same time that the 
primary project financing closed.  Since all of the intended uses for the loan proceeds were t
operational in nature (or at least not capital- or construction-related), it was presumed that the 
loan would not trigger a PTC haircut.  Because the Crescent Ridge project ultimately chose a 
non-leveraged financing structure, however, debt service reserve funds were not required, and 
the zero-interest loan therefore never closed. 
 
S
uncharted area of tax law.  If the USDA decides to offer loans as part of the Section 9006 
program, this may be an area worth exploring, in which case consultation with tax counsel 
knowledgeable in this area is strongly encouraged.  On the other hand, the amount of a wind 
project’s overall cost that is not tied to the PTC is likely to be relatively small, in which case the
size of the loan – and in turn the value that it provides to the project – would also have to be 
relatively small.  For example, Figure 2 in Section 5.2 showed that the value of even a heavily 
subsidized loan is rather muted at low amounts of leverage. 
 
 
                                                 
30 For example, Ing (2002) notes that the PTC applies to electricity generated at a “qualified facility,” and that the 
IRS has ruled that each “wind turbine together with its tower and supporting pad” is a separate qualified facility 
(provided it meets “placed in service” and other requirements).  Thus, if a wind project is considered to be made
of individual quali
 up 
fying facilities, one might conclude that other aspects of the project – such as roads, transmission 
lines, and substations – fall outside of the scope of the PTC.  As such, grants or subsidized loans targeting such 
expenditures might not cause a PTC haircut. 
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7.  Conclusions 
w 
ss the United States to explore the possibility 
 
ly 
equity partners that are able to 
onetize the credits.  As such, how the Section 9006 program interacts with the PTC has become 
s 
 
to 
t a 
 
tion 9006 grant, as well as the possibility of an 
nsuccessful application, and some might be left with relatively little motivation to apply. 
 to 
f 
 capital – costs, depending on the 
reference of the recipient.  Alternatively, it could award the grant funding in the form of 
roduction-based payments, either paid out over time or as a lump sum at the inception of 
commercial operations (i.e., more like a traditional grant).  A combination of legislative history, 
                                                
 
The USDA’s Section 9006 program has been successful at stimulating the development of ne
renewable energy and energy efficiency projects in rural communities.  Perhaps just as 
importantly, the program has inspired farmers acro
of harvesting a new crop – renewable energy.
 
When the Section 9006 program was first envisioned, the possibility that portions of it might 
negatively interact with the PTC was apparently of little concern.31  Indeed, the program was 
intended to enable project ownership among farmers and other rural entities that have typical
been unable to access Federal tax incentives for renewable energy.  In retrospect, however, 
virtually all large wind projects that have been awarded Section 9006 grants to date (large wind 
projects have been awarded 40% of all Section 9006 grant funding to date) are attempting to 
make use of the PTC, in many cases by bringing in corporate 
m
an important issue.   
 
This report demonstrates that the magnitude of the interaction is significant:  Section 9006 grant
lose between 11% and 46% of their value (depending on the project’s capital cost and capacity 
factor) to PTC haircuts.32  An additional 20%-37% (depending on tax bracket) is lost to income
tax payments on the grant.  In combination, depending on the specific combination of tax 
bracket, capital cost, and capacity factor that pertain to a given project, the percentage of a 
Section 9006 grant lost to both income tax payments and the PTC haircut can range from 31% 
83% of the dollar value of the grant.  Our base-case scenario falls in the middle of that range, a
combined loss of 58% (37% due to income tax payments, and 21% due to PTC haircut).  Add to
this the transaction costs of applying for a Sec
u
 
As a result, the USDA may – with Congressional approval potentially a prerequisite – wish
consider revising the Section 9006 program in order to maximize its value in the presence o
other Federal incentives.  Although the taxation of the grant cannot be avoided,33 the PTC 
haircut (equal to 21% of the grant in the base case) is potentially avoidable, if not through direct 
legislative relief, then through careful structuring of the incentive (which also may require 
statutory changes).  Specifically, with proper statutory authority, the USDA could potentially 
allow its grants to be used to defray operational – rather than
p
p
 
31 Negative PTC interaction was also not addressed in public comments on the proposed program rules, at least 
according to the USDA’s summary of those comments.  Allowing passive tax equity investors (interested in using 
PTCs) to participate in the program, however, was the subject of several comments (for a summary of comments, 
see http://www.rurdev.usda.gov/rd/farmbill/section9006rule.pdf). 
32 Loan guarantees, however, do not trigger a PTC haircut – see Section 4.2. 
33 One must either pay tax on the grant (if taxable), or else reduce the depreciable basis of the project by the amount 
of the grant (if non-taxable).  The only difference between the two is the time value of money – the tax payment on a
taxable grant hits up in the first year, whereas the equivalent loss of tax benefits associated with a reduction in 
depreciable basis occurs over a six-year perio
 
d (assuming mid-year convention). 
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public IRS guidance, a
igger a PTC haircut (though advance consultati
nd private letter rulings suggest that any of these three options will not 
on with the IRS is nevertheless advisable). 
 
rovide little or no advantage over the 
is 
es 
e potential solutions to the double-dipping problem discussed in this report 
g to 
tr
 
Finally, the USDA is reportedly considering a direct loan program for future rounds of Section 
9006 funding.  Given the PTC interaction, such a program is likely to provide little (if any) value
to projects that also take the PTC:  a government loan will either cause a PTC haircut that will 
kely result in a net loss (if subsidized), or else will pli
private market (if unsubsidized).  It may be possible to structure a subsidized loan such that it 
applied strictly to non-capital costs, and therefore does not offset the PTC, but there has been 
little experience with this type of structure to date, and consultation with knowledgeable tax 
counsel is strongly recommended before proceeding down this path. 
 
Given the complexities and nuances of tax law, the USDA would be wise to seek experienced 
tax counsel, and perhaps IRS guidance, prior to implementing any of the programmatic chang
discussed in this report.  Furthermore, depending on how broadly the language in Section 
9006(a)(1) – i.e., that funds are to be used to “purchase renewable energy systems” – can be 
terpreted, each of thin
might require statutory changes to the Section 9006 program’s authorizing legislation (i.e., the 
USDA may not have the authority to make such changes on its own).  In this light, it is perhaps 
important to conclude by noting that the PTC's anti-double-dipping provisions were put in place 
for a reason.  While state renewable energy programs have generally been interested in 
structuring their incentives in ways that will not trigger a PTC haircut (i.e., states are lookin
leverage as many Federal dollars as possible), Congress may be considerably less interested in 
modifying one Federal program (the USDA’s Section 9006 program) to allow the “double-
dipping” of another (the Section 45 PTC). 
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Appendix A:  Text of Section 9006 of the 2002 Farm Bill 
IM
(a) d loan guarantees under 
oth uarantees, and grants to farmers, ranchers, and 
ral small businesses to— 
(b) nder subsection (a), a farmer, rancher, or 
ral small business shall demonstrate financial need as determined by the Secretary. 
f the cost of 
the activity funded under subsection (a). 
The 
de or guaranteed shall not exceed 50 
percent of the cost of the activity funded under subsection (a). 
l take 
(A) the type of renewable energy system to be purchased; 
 quantity of energy to be generated by the renewable energy 
system; 
(D) the extent to which the renewable energy system will be replicable; 
demonstrated by an energy audit comparable to an energy audit under section 
(F) the estimated length of time it would take for the energy savings generated by 
the activity to equal the cost of the activity; and 
(G) other factors as appropriate. 
(d) INTEREST RATE.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—A loan made by the Secretary under subsection (a) shall bear 
interest at the rate equivalent to the rate of interest charged on Treasury securities of 
comparable maturity on the date the loan is approved. 
(2) DURATION.—The interest rate for each loan will remain in effect for the term of the 
loan. 
(e) CONSULTATION.—In carrying out this section, the Secretary shall consult with the 
Secretary of Energy. 
(f) FUNDING.—Of the funds of the Commodity Credit Corporation, the Secretary shall make 
available to carry out this section $23,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2003 through 2007. 
 
SEC. 9006. RENEWABLE ENERGY SYSTEMS AND ENERGY EFFICIENCY 
PROVEMENTS. 
IN GENERAL.—In addition to exercising authority to make loans an
er law, the Secretary shall make loans, loan g
ru
(1) purchase renewable energy systems; and 
(2) make energy efficiency improvements. 
ELIGIBILITY.—To be eligible to receive a grant u
ru
(c) COST SHARING.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.— 
(A) GRANTS.—The amount of a grant shall not exceed 25 percent o
(B) MAXIMUM AMOUNT OF COMBINED GRANT AND LOAN.—
combined amount of a grant and loan ma
(2) FACTORS.—In determining the amount of a grant or loan, the Secretary shal
into consideration, as applicable— 
(B) the estimated
(C) the expected environmental benefits of the renewable energy system; 
(E) the amount of energy savings expected to be derived from the activity, as 
9005; 
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